

<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>C O N F I D E N T I A L</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMA 58925
TO INFO	Chief, CA (Attn: <input type="checkbox"/> EE, COS/G		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 200-134-39/3
FROM	Chief, Munich Operations Group		DATE 25 May 1962
SUBJECT	CAMOG/CHEROOT/QKACTIVE/Operations Transmittal of Memos		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) <input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	For your information		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)	<p>Forwarded under separate cover are two memos from QKACTIVE personnel covering some of the points that were discussed with our recent inquiring visitors. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> has no doubt briefed you on the discussions which were held with him.</p> <p>Attachments: (UNDER SEPARATE COVER) Memos (2)</p> <p>Distribution: 2 - CA w/atts 1 - EE w/o atts 2 - COS/G w/atts</p> <p>DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C BY RID/AN 10 June 62</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3020 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007</p>		
FORM 10-57 (40) 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION <b>C O N F I D E N T I A L</b>	PAGE NO. 200-134-39/3

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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT -- TO EGMA 58925

3 May 1962

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Claire Dees

FROM: Mr. Edward Crowley

SUBJECT: Interview on Tuesday, 1 May 1962:  
Additional Remarks Concerning the Question  
of Establishing the Institute in Munich  
Rather Than in South America  
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One of the strong points in favor of locating in Munich is that it lends an air of technical accuracy and reliability to the Institute's publications. Germany has a very favorable academic and scientific reputation in the Latin American countries in particular and in the other underdeveloped areas of the world as well. The fact that Germany has no colonial possessions and has not had for some years is also a distinct advantage. If the Institute were located some place in South America it would have to utilize persons with previous affiliations either political or academic that would not be generally acceptable to all elements of the Latin American groups to which we appeal, i.e. educators, political leaders, editors of newspapers and government officials. Coming from Munich our publications, therefore, have a third person, unbiased point of view, and since we deal primarily with factual information from Soviet materials, what we say is more readily believed. To repeat what I said the other day, other reasons for locating in Munich are the inability or reluctance of emigres to emigrate and the presence in Munich, or within easy access, of primary and reference Soviet source materials.

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25 May 62  
200-124-389/3

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May 14, 1962

Outline of Discussion:

A. Primary Responsibilities of the Security Function.

- (a) Clearance of personnel.
- (b) Physical security.
- (c) Employee morale in terms of personal security.

(This concerning our emigre employees, many of whom avoided repatriation after World War II, or who later fled from the USSR and who, particularly because of their association with ACL, fear action against them by the USSR. The various media and methods employed by the USSR, including personal contact of the emigres, were covered.)

B. Methods and Procedures in Handling (a), (b) and (c) of above.

C. Relationship Between Munich and New York Offices.

D. Liaison with Local Authorities -- German and American.

E. What Were Considered the Most Serious Security Threats.

A threat of some concern stems from A(c) above. USSR methods not only threaten, ridicule and shame the emigration but also urge their return to the "homeland". Many emigres left families behind in the USSR, which factor is used as a lever by the USSR.

Another concern to ACL under this heading is not only the interest of the USSR, but also that of German and U.S. authorities, in our emigre group because of their unique background (coming from the USSR). Because we cooperate with and look to these latter authorities in connection with the items covered under Paragraph A above, our interest in maintaining a free radio theoretically is jeopardized. In practice, however, it seems that, over the years, American and German authorities have come to understand our problem and in weighing the overall benefits to be gained, respect ACL interests. It was noted also that German authorities are cooperative with respect to safety of our personnel since any problems along this line reflect adversely also upon their own government.

F. Effectiveness of ACL Efforts.

On the subject I felt unqualified to give a meaningful response. I indicated that, without reference to the cost factor, at least I was in a position of seeing positive results in connection with our Radio effort, i.e., in the important battle for the minds of men. I indicated that the effort directed against ACL and its personnel by the USSR seemed to be a reasonably good measure indicating our effectiveness.

G. Emergency planning matters and the need for the allocation of funds in this connection were discussed.

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